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1. Introduction
A federal constitution is to a great extent realized and experienced by the shar­
ing of government income between central and states’ governments. Their 
sharing of power has to be matched by a congruent sharing of income so as to 
lay the concrete foundation for the autonomy of the component states. The 
regulation of the sharing of total government income is part of the constitu­
tional law of a federal state. Different systems of sharing of total government 
income exist. In some cases money is made available without conditions at­
tached, in other cases money is transferred for fixed programs and under de­
tailed conditions. In several cases both systems go together.
In Australia as well as in the US the actual sharing of income is to a greater de­
gree than in the Federal Republic of Germany a matter of political decision­
making for which their constitutions only provide a basis in a very general 
way.
In the Federal Republic of Germany the sharing of government income is pre­
scribed in great detail in Chapter X of the Constitution itself. This circumstance 
has given cause to an advanced degree of juridification of the system of sharing 
in which development the Constitutional Court (“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) 
plays an important role. As its interpretation of the German constitutional rules 
on sharing at the same time relates to concepts which are implemented in other 
federal states, this juridification of the German system might find a wider inter­
est. This article has been written in order to meet such interest.
As for the nature and function of these constitutional rules the “Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht” is of the opinion1 that these rules are addressed to the federal 
legislator, who is not to confine himself to only translating the political deci-
* Dr. Roberts is an ex Dutch diplomat. He defended his doctoral thesis about the “Power of the Purse” in the Law 
Faculty of the University of Leyden in 1996. He is a comparatist of public law, is mainly interested in federal and 
pseudo-federal constructions and specialises in intergovernmental financial relations. He works in the Catholic 
University of Nimwegen.
1 The decisions of the Constitutional Court referred to in this article are mainly the decisions of 24 June 1986 and 
of 27 May 1992 concerning Articles 106 and 107 of the German constitution. The decisions are published in vol. 
72, p.330 -  346, and volume 86 p. 148 -  279 of a series under the title “Entscheidungen des Bundesver­
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sions favoured by the majority of the component states (hereinafter also called 
“the “Laender”) into law. The federal legislator has to legislate in accordance 
with the normative requirements set by the Constitution.
As regards the norms involved the Court was of the opinion that the Constitu­
tion itself does not draw clear borderlines between arbitrariness and reasonable 
compromise. The required reasonableness and willingness for compromise may 
not be supposed to exist when substantial and contrary financial interests are at 
stake, so the Court found. These qualities have to be stimulated and supported. 
The Constitution offers this support by putting legal requirements to political 
decisionmaking. These have to be honoured in negotiations and may be invoked 
in order to arrive at an equitable compromise for all concerned (72, 396 ff.).
In the following pages the process of dividing government income as laid down 
in the German Constitution is described in such a way as to demonstrate the role 
of the jurisprudence of the “Bundesverfassungsgericht” in the successive phases 
of the process.
2. The states ’ revenues and the shared taxes
2.1. The revenues of the German component states consist of the receipts out of
a) own resources, amongst which local taxes, levies and the revenues of 
state enterprises are the most important
b) a share in the yield of certain taxes introduced by Federal law (“Ge­
meinschaftssteuern”)
c) complemental general purpose grants by the Federal Treasury (“Er- 
gaenzungszuweisungen”)
d) specific grants transferred by the Federal Treasury in accordance with 
specific legislation.
The revenues under a), b) and c) are at the free disposal of the ““Laender””.
The specific grants mentioned under d) are based on specific Federal legislation 
which requires the approval of the Federal Senate, being the representative body 
of the “Laender”.
This article mainly deals with the income mentioned under b) and c).
2.2. In order to demonstrate the importance of the subject in a concrete way it 
may be mentioned here that total government income of the Federation and the 
“Laender” together amounted in 1997 to DM 1.787 mrd., or 49% of GDP.
The income of the governments in the “Laender” together came to DM 771 mrd. 
or 43% of total government income in Germany.
The flow of general purpose money mentioned under b) en c) above amounted 
to DM 319,5 mrd. or 41% of the income of all “Laender” goverments.
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The specific grants mentioned under d) above are estimated at DM 95,5 mrd. or 
12% of the income of all “Laender” governments. So, the volume of specific 
grants is about one third less of the the amount of general purpose money men­
tioned under b) and c). Before the German reunion in 1990 the volume of the 
specific grants compared with the general purpose moneyflow was much less.
2.3. The moneyflow under b) and c) has
- a vertical aspect, i.e. the total amount of general purpose money which comes 
at the free disposal of the “Laender”,
- an horizontal aspect, i.e. the distribution of the total amount among the 
“Laender”.
The German Constitution holds detailed rules for the sharing of tax revenues 
between the Federation and the “Laender”, as well as for the distribution 
among the “Laender”. Especially the latter distribution has given cause to juris­
prudence of the “Bundesverfassungsgericht”.
3. The vertical aspect
3.1. The total amount of general purpose money which comes at the free dis­
posal of the “Laender” is dependent on the revenue of three major taxes, plus 
the amount which the Federal Treasury is to make available for the comple- 
mental general purpose grants (“Ergaenzungszuweisungen”). The volume of 
latter amount is dependent on the recognized needs of the less prosperous 
“Laender” as defined under The horizontal aspect, see para. 4.
3.2. The main source of income of the “Laender” is their share in three major 
taxes levied by Federal legislation (“Gemeinschaftsteuern”). They share these 
taxes with the Federation in accordance with article 106 of the Constitution. 
These taxes are the most remunerative ones. The “Gemeinschaftsteuern” to­
gether yield 74,5% of total tax revenue in the Federal Republic. They are: the 
corporation tax, the incometax and the turnover tax. The revenue of the in- 
cometax is the largest, it yielded 64% of the receipts of the shared taxes together 
in 1995.
In accordance with Article 106 of the Constitution the corporation tax and the 
incometax are equally divided between the Federation and the “Laender” after a 
reduction of 15% of the incometax for the support of local governments. The 
revenue of the turnover tax is to be divided between Federation and “Laender” 
in common agreement. So, this division is a negotiable issue between Federa­
tion and “Laender”2.
2 The German tumovertax is a consumption- and distributiontax. It has got the structure of an added value tax.
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3.3. The Federation and the “Laender” have to negotiate about their shares in 
the turnover tax. It is the only flexible element in the system of the vertical divi­
sion of the “Gemeinschaftssteuern” because the share of each in the corporation 
and the incometax has already been fixed by the Constitution itself at 50%.
The agreed shares in the turnover tax have to be laid down in a federal law 
which requires the approval of the Senate. The agreed percentages are to apply 
for an indeterminate period.
The German Constitution contains guidelines for the abovementioned negotia- 
tions3. These have to take into account that
- the Federation and the “Laender” have an equal claim to the average of their 
necessary expenditure planned over a medium term.
- the requirements of the partners are to be coordinated in such a way that a fair 
result is to be obtained, overburdening of the taxpayer is avoided and the uni­
formity of living standards in the Federal Republic is guaranteed.
These guidelines are rather difficult to substantiate. The “Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht ” argued on this issue that the final meaning of the different ele­
ments in this summing up is to arrive at a fair result in which the equal coverage 
of the financial requirements between the Federation and the “Laender” is hon­
oured. It is the intention that already in the vertical divison of the turnover tax 
the expenditure and the financial needs4 of the “Laender” is to be taken account 
of. (72, 384)
3.5. According to Art. 106(4) of the Constitution the shares in the turnover tax, 
once being established, are to be modified whenever the relation of revenues to 
expenditures of the Federation develops substantially differently from that of 
the “Laender”. This provision holds an obligation for the Federation to take the 
initiative. It does not preclude the Federation and the “Laender” to arrange for a 
modification of the division in common agreement when the above situation 
does not occur. (72, 384)
3.6. The share of the “Laender” in the turnover-tax has been increased from 
37% to 44% in 1995. So, the Federation receives at the moment 56% of the 
revenues from this tax. This apportionnement is part of the Consolidation Law 
of 1993 5, by which the interimrules in force in the former ”East German” 
“Laender” were replaced by the rules already in force in the “West German” 
“Laender”.
3 Art. 106(3)
4 The word “financial needs” have to be read in the context of the jurisprudence which has been developped in 
connection with the words “financial equalisation”, dealt with in para. 4.3. of this Article.
5 “Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Federalen Konsolidierungsprograms” (Act for the replacement of the Federal Con- 
solidationprogram) of 23.6.1993 (Bundesgestzblatt 1993 I 944), entering into force on 1 January 1995
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4.1. The receipts of the income and the corporation tax accrue to the individual 
“Laender” in which the money is economically earned. In many instances, how­
ever, taxes are collected in an other ““Land””. Therefore the Constitution pro­
vides for a Federal interstate tax law by which the effect of these distortions is 
countered “by volume and nature” (Art. 107(1)). The “Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht ” was of the opinion that the Federal legislator has a discretion of 
its own in interpreting the words “nature” and “volume”, this discretion only 
being limited by the requirement that the distortion had to be corrected substan­
tially, not marginally. The Court added that the Constitution in the article under 
discussion - as well as in the other rules laid down in the financial chapter of the 
Constitution - only offers a normative framework, leaving it to the Federal leg­
islator to fill it up as he sees fit. (72, 395)
The “Laender”-share of the turnover tax is distributed among the “Laender” in 
proportion to their population. However, this distribution is at the same time 
adapted so as to correct differences in the income of the ““Laender””- govern­
ments .
4.2. The distribution of the ““Laender””- share of the turnover tax over the 
“Laender” has been regulated as follows.
The German Constitution prescribes in its Article 107(2) that 
by a Federal law ( a )
the differences in financial capacity ( b )
will be reduced “to a reasonable level” ( c )
ad a) It is the Federation which is responsible for the horizontal distribution 
and the equalisation.
The “Bundesverfassungsgericht ” concluded from this text that its first 
aim was to withhold the horizontal distribution from free negotiations 
between the “Laender”. However, the Federation has to be more than just 
a chairman of the negotiations. It has to test the outcome of the negotia­
tions against the norms set by the Constitution. (72, 396)
The Federal legislator draws up the necessary Bill to be voted on by sim­
ple majority.
This is the Financial Settlement Act6 which is intended to remain in force 
for an indeterminate period. The Act requires the approval of the Senate.
4. The horizontal aspect
6 Its latest version is of 23 June 1993 (Bgbl. I, 944) which entered into force on 1 Janaury 1995. It has been 
amended, lastly, on 16 June 1998 (Bgbl. 1998 I 1290)
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ad b) The expression “differences in financial capacity” is unclear, the Consti­
tution does not define the words “financial capacity”. The question arose 
whether “financial capacity” should be equated with “tax revenue”.
The “Bundesverfassungsgericht ” was of the opinion in its judgment of 
1986 that the Federal legislator is free to determine which revenues are to 
be taken into account for calculating the financial capacity of a “Land”. 
There is no necessity to add up all revenues of a “Land”. The Constitu­
tion obliges the Federal legislator to lay down only a yardstick for mak­
ing comparisons amongst the “Laender” in this respect. So some revenues 
could be left out if their amount is too small, or if they have the same 
level for all “Laender”, or if the tracing of the revenues is not worthwhile 
in view of the costs involved. (72, 400)
In its judgment of 1997 the Court added that the ownership of property 
could not be considered when determining the financial capacity of a 
“Land” (95, 263).
The words “financial capacity” have also been related to “financial 
needs”. The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” argued that it would indeed be 
justified to take financial needs into account when determining on the 
level of financial capacity, but only as far as these needs would give oc­
casion to expenditures for objectively given circumstances which could 
arise in any “Land”. (72, 401) This requirement excludes expenditures 
which are the direct and foreseeable consequence of political decisions 
made by the “Laender” governments, whilst excercising their powers.
(72, 405)
The requirement has been met by taking into account the size of the 
population of German cities when calculating the financial capacity of the 
““Laender””. In this way the level of urbanisation leads to a modulation 
in the horizontal distribution of the ““Laender””-share of the turnover tax. 
The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” added - by way of exemption on the 
above rule - that also the specific expenditure on seaports might be de­
duced when calculating the financial capacity, this already being a prac­
tice since 1923. (72, 401)
The needs which are to be taken account of when calculating financial 
capacity are laid down in the Financial Settlement Act.
Ad c) According to the Constitution the reduction of the differences in financial 
capacity must actually be applied when the financial capacity of a “Land” 
remains below a certain percentage of the average financial capacity of 
the “Laender” together. An equalisationprocess is then to be followed in 
order to supplement the income of such a “Land” to that percentage.
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The Financial Settlement Act fixes that figure at present on 95%. The 
supplemental amounts are to be financed by the “Laender” which receive 
more than the average income. In this way the system creates a number of 
paying and a number of receiving “Laender”. However, there is a limit: 
The supplemental amounts may not exceed one quarter of a “Land”’s 
share calculated in accordance with a distribution on a per capita basis.
Fixing the abovementioned percentage is an important issue for negotia­
tion between the Federation and the “Laender”.The German Constitution 
contains norms for this negotiation. On this issue the “Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht” is of the opinion that reasonable equalisation means arriv­
ing at a compromise honouring the financial autonomy of the “Laender” 
as well as the solidarity inherent to the federal principle. The solidarity 
entails a duty for the more prosperous “Laender” to assist the less pros­
perous ones without at the same time creating an obligation of a strict 
equalisation of government income. For, it would be contrary to the fed­
eral principle to supply the less prosperous “Laender” with an absolute 
income guarantee by way of the equalisation system. (72,404) In this way 
they would become detached from the political community of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. So the “Bundesverfassungsgericht” argued. 
(72,419)
All this means in practice that in fixing the abovementioned percentage 
for the ceiling of the supplemental amount some distance has to be kept 
from the amount of the average financial capacity.
4.3. Up to the in the above described first phase of the equalisation process the 
distribution of income over the “Laender” has a certain automatism. Its results 
are obtained by calculations prescribed by the Constitution and the Financial 
Settlement Act. The system is financed out of the ““Laender””-share of the 
turnover-tax.
However, the German Constitution recognises that this first phase might not 
lead to a reasonable financial equalisation because of the limit set. “Laender” 
which do not reach at the 95% of the average state’s income by the implemen­
tation of the above system, the so-called financially weak ones, receive com- 
plemental general purpose grants (“Ergaenzungszuweisungen”) for the coverage 
of their general financial requirements. These grants are not to be financed out 
of the distribution system but by the Federal Treasury. The Constitution pro­
vides only for the possibility of granting such complemental grants. However, 
the “Bundesverfassungsgericht’ was of the opinion that the greater the the gap 
between the result of the first phase of the equalisation and the average income 
of the “Laender” is, the more obligatory the application of this possibility be­
comes. (72, 403)
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5. The "Ergaenzungszuweisungen "
5.1. The “Bundesverfassungsgericht”considers the allotment of complemental 
general purpose grants as the second and last phase of the equalisationprocess. 
Sufficient financial means have to be reserved for it by the Federal Treasury. In 
this connection the Court referred to art. 106 of the German Constitution which 
provides for a modification of the percentages in the sharing of the turnover tax 
if expenditures in the Federation develop substantially different from that of the 
“Laender”. By doing so the Court seems to lay a priority with the financial 
needs of the “Laender”. The “Laender” have to have sufficient financial means 
at their disposal to exercise their powers. The Court underlines its argument by 
adding that the principle of loyalty (“Bundestreue”) creates an obligation in this 
respect for the Federal Government.
Being a final phase of the equalisationprocess implies that the result of this sec­
ond phase added to the first one cannot surpass the set 95% limit of the average 
financial capacity of the “Laender” together (72, 402), at least when this final 
phase consists only of a topping up of the first phase.
5.2. As may be gathered from the text of article 107(2) of the Constitution , the 
financial needs of the “Laender” may be taken into account when calculating 
the amount of the complemental general purpose grants.
The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” concluded from this text that special financial 
burdens (“Sonderlasten”) which a “Land” caries, may be included in the calcu­
lations of these complemental grants. (72, 402) These financial burdens, how­
ever, may not be brought about by political decisions which a “Land” takes 
when exercising its powers. (72, 405)
In its judgment the Court pointed out that the Constitution does not limit the 
total amount of the complemental grants and that these complemental grants 
might constitute a substantial part of the total amount involved in the equalisa­
tion process. (72, 403) The amount of the special burdens might even - in ex­
ceptional cases - lead to a transgression of the 95% limit9 .
7 The principle of “Bundestreue” has been developped in a series of judgments by the Court. It implies extra 
duties surpassing the described formal obligations existing between the Federation and the “Laender”, as well as 
limitations in the implementation of formally allotted powers. In accordance with this principle there is an 
increased duty to co-operation if unanimity is required for a decision.
8 The text in Article 107(2) reads: “ Es kann auch bestimmen dasz der Bund aus seinen Mitteln leistungsschwa­
chen “Laender”n Zuweisungen zur ergeaenzenden Deckung ihres algemeinen Finanzbedarfs (Ergaenzungszu­
weisungen) gewaehrt. See also para. 4.2. above.
9 See para. 5.4.
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The Federation has to specify the special burdens which it will thus compensate, 
and deal with those requirements of the “Laender” in the same way (72, 405).
5.3. One category of special burdens got extra attention of the “Bundensverfas- 
sungsgericht ”, that is the so-called emergency budget situation (“Haushalts­
notlage”).
An emergency budget situation might be taken account of when calculating the 
complemental grants but only as far as this means a temporary assistance in a 
process of selfhelp which is undertaken by the “Land” in question, and on the 
condition that assistance could not be rendered in an other way. The condition 
that this “special burden” has not been caused by (inconsiderate) political deci­
sions of the “Land” concerned, is to be applied in a relaxed way in these cases. 
(86, 261)
5.4. Within the category of emergency budget situations the “Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht” discerns the even more stringent case of an “extreme emergency 
budget situation”. This case presents itself when the “Land” in question is un­
able to perform its duties anymore and cannot free itself, by its own power, of 
the emergency situation. The Court argues circumstantially and is digging deep 
on behalf of these “Laender”. It starts from the wellkown position that the fi­
nancial chapter in the Constitution intends to guarantee the “Laender” to be fi­
nancially capable to perform their duties. It adds that it is not sufficient for the 
“Laender” to be capable to pay their bills, they must also be able to exercise 
actually their autonomous powers.
In a second line of reasoning the Court refers to Article 109 of the Constitution 
which prescribes that the Federation and the “Laender” have to take into ac­
count the requirement of an overall economic equilibrium in their budgetpolicy. 
The Court concludes from all this that Federation and “Laender” are bound to 
solidarity and that the principle of mutual assistance is part of the federal struc­
ture mentioned in Article 20 of the Constitution. (86, 264)
The Court warns that this conclusion would not justify a deviation from the 
normal pattern of decisionmaking. It is the Federation which, in accordance 
with its obligations in the equalisation process as laid down in the Constitution, 
must take the initiative when cases of an “extreme emergency budget situation” 
arise. The Court explains that it intended by this reasoning only an intensifica­
tion of allready existing obligations and to give an interpretation concerning 
nature and extent of the possibilities already offered by the Constitution.
As regards the financial consequences of its conclusions the Court was of the 
opinion that these had to be borne by the Federation and the “Laender” together. 
The amount of the complemental grants might in these cases temporarily sur­
pass the 95% limit on the condition that a program for reform is being followed 
by the Government in question. (86,269)
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5.5. The judgments by the Court concerning the complemental general purpose 
grants and the reunification of Germany in 1990 have led to a diversity of spe­
cial financial burdens which might be compensated by complemental grants.
The Financial Settlement Act provides for the following:
a) Complemental grants in view of special needs. This category of grants is only 
allotted to the former East German “Laender” in relation to expenditure made to 
undo the former partition of Germany ("teilungsbedingte Sonderlasten"). It is 
the largest category of special financial burdens.
b) Complemental grants for small type financially weak “Laender” because of 
their disproportionally high costs to support a full blown public service.
c) Special complemental grants in assistance to “Laender” in extreme emer­
gency budget situations
d) Interim complemental grants on behalf of the former “West”- German finan­
cially weak “Laender” in compensation for the disproportionate large reduction 
of their income out of the “Laender” share in the turnover tax.
e) Deficiency complemental grants on behalf of former West- en East-German 
“Laender” which do not carry special financial burdens but may only be consid­
ered for a topping up of the results of the first phase of the equalisation process.
The total amount of complemental grants rose in 1995 to 26,3 mrd. DM and is 
larger than the amount redistributed between more and less prosperous 
“Laender” in the first phase of the equalisation process (DM 20 mrd.).
6. A case on the borderline
6.1. As mentioned above complemental grants may be supplied in the equalisa­
tion process on account of special financial burdens. This circumstance evokes 
the question of the relationship between general purpose assistance and the spe­
cific grants-in-aid by the Federal authorities, especially the ones for investment 
assistance.
The “Bundesverfassungsgericht ” itself made the connection between comple­
mental general purpose grants and specific investment assistance in its judg­
ment of 1992. It mentioned the possiblity to make use of the instruments of 
“joint tasks” (“Gemeinschaftsaufgaben”, Art. 91a of the Constitution) and of 
financial investment assistance (“Finanzhilfe”, Art. 104a) in cases in which spe­
cific burdens are alleged. Both instruments provide for financial assistance or 
compensation in the case of large investments or expenditures. In its judgment 
the Court points out that a specific grants could be the more suitable money- 
transfer because the Federation is not obliged to spread this specific assistance 
over all financially weak “Laender” as is the case when asssistance is rendered
Bremen en Saar”Land” are the German “Laender” which are in this situation.
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by way of the general purpose complemental grants. (86, 268) Moreover, it is of 
the opinion that in the case of an extreme emergency budget situation the gov­
ernment in question could be told which instrument is to be chosen. (86, 269) 
The above judgment was made in a case of an extreme emergency budget 
situation. However, also in connection with a “simple” emergency budget situa­
tion the reservation has been made “that no other solution had to be possible”
10, meaning that also in these “simple cases” the Federation may consider - in 
consultation with the “Land” in question - if the instrument of an specific in­
vestment grant is not to be preferred over a complemental general purpose 
grant.
6.2. By this judgment a clear borderline existing in the German financing sys­
tem for the “Laender” has been broken. In the original set up the “Laender” 
would mainly receive their income out of the “Gemeinschaftsteuern” as com­
plemented by the complemental general purpose grants. Specific grants in aid 
had to remain an exception, they had to fulfill the conditions painstakingly laid 
down in the Constitution so as to protect the “Laender” against federal domi­
nance. In 1975 the “Bundesverfassungsgericht ” still gave as its opinion that 
specific investment grants had to remain rare and that this instrument could 
never be used to replace income out of the equalisation system. (39, 108) At 
present the Bundesverfassungsgericht typefies specific investment assistance in 
the case of an emergency budgetsituation as a complement of the equalisation 
system.
7. Concluding remarks
7.1. It may be evident from the above that the role of the “Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht” in the sharing of government income between the Federation and 
the “Laender” has increased after the reunion of Germany in 1990. However, its 
role has also been of importance before that event.
- In its earlier judgments the Bundesgericht underlined repeatedly the responsi­
bility of the Federation concerning the well-functioning of the system. The Fed­
eration also has to take the initiative when only “Laender”- interests would re­
quire this.
- The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” has given the Federal legislator the necessary 
leeway by only globally defining the norms by which the latter had to act.
- The objective criterium which it has laid down for the calculation of financial 
capacity (“Finanzkraft”), has been of great importance for the right implemen­
tation of the equalisation.
- Also of importance has been its reasoning concerning the degree of equalisa­
tion which had to be reached at. In its reasoning it prudentially tried to avoid
10 See para. 5.3.
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discouraging the governments of the more prosperous “Laender” and to thwart 
the energy of the less prosperous ones by guaranteeing an average income.
By these judgments the “Bundesverfassungsgericht” has strengtened the basis 
of the system of the sharing of Government income between the Federation and 
the ““Laender””.
7.2. The Court, however, also supported and regulated by its judgments a neces­
sary development of the system.
- By allowing special financial burdens ("Sonderlasten") to rise to a substantial 
volume in the equalisationsystem, it broke away from the original intention of 
the Constitution that the “Ergaenzungszuweisungen” would only be a subsidi­
ary, complemental part of the system. At first, it did maintain, however, the 
strictly objective criteria also for the second phase of the equalisationprocess.
- After the reunion of Germany its recognition of “the emergency budget situa­
tion” and “the extreme emergency budgetsituation” as categories of special fi­
nancial burdens did away with the requirement of objective criteria for this type 
of “Sonderlast”
- The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” was also induced by that time to invoke the 
principle of loyalty (“Bundestreue”) and to lay down out that Federation and 
“Laender” are bound to solidarity and to mutual financial assistance. This 
strengthened a two way system: not only the Federation has a duty to assist the 
“Laender”, but the “Laender” too have to assist the Federation so as to enable it 
to fullfill its duties.
- The increased volume of the “Ergaenzungszuweisungen”, especially in the 
cases of emergency budget situation and the extreme emergency budgetsitua­
tion, made it quite natural for the Court to relate this type of assistance to the 
macro-economic responsability of the Federation. This development dinted the 
autonomy of the “Laender” somewhat.
7.3. The “Bundesverfassungsgericht” construed very prudently the build-up of 
its jurisprudence accompanying the political developments in Germany. It left 
open the road backwards by tailoring its jurisprudence to the specifics of the 
present situation. When in the foreseeable future the differences in prosperity 
between the “Laender” will diminish, the judgments which could imply a cer­
tain threat to the “Laender”-autonomy will automatically lose their relevance.
So, the existing system of the sharing of Government income as provided for in 
the Constitution has been saved notwithstanding the great pressure put on it by 
the German reunion of 1990. Federal legislator and “Bundesverfassungsgericht” 
teamed up to succeed in this. The Federal legislator created a greater volume of 
money to be redistributed under the system, the “Bundesverfassungsgericht”
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adapted it to withstand the pressures by its interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions.
7.4. However the objections of the more prosperous West-German “Laender” 
against the system are increasing. Their allegation is that the Equalisation Sys­
tem affects them in a disproportional way. They pointed out in a request to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht11 that 4 “Laender”, which have more than 110% fi­
nancial capacity, end up below the 95% limit of the avarage after implementa­
tion of the Equalisation. They concluded by asking that certain articles in the 
Financial Settlement Act be declared contrary to article 107 of the German Con­
stitution, and that the Court set a date for their expiry.
In its judgment of 23 September 1999 the “Bundesverfassungsgericht ” decided 
not to pronounce on the challenged articles of the Financial Settlement Act be­
cause of the uncertainties in the assessment which then would have to be made 
by it of the present and the future economic and political developments. Instead 
it ordered the legislator to clarify the Financial Settlement Act by an act pro­
viding standards on a number of passages in the Financial Settlement Act (a 
“Maszgaebegesetz”) before 1 January 2003, and to renew the Financial Settle­
ment Act per 1 January 2005 incorporating these standards. The Court stated in 
its instructions expressly that differences in financial capacity had to be reduced 
by the equalisation system, not enlarged. The “Laender” must not forfeit their 
position in the order of prosperity by the system in such a way that they would 
end up at the other end of the scale of financial capacity.
So, in this instance too the Bundesverfassungsgericht clearly teamed up with the 
political leadership. For the Coalitionpartners in the German Federal Govern­
ment had already expressed in their program of 20 October 1998 their intention 
to prepare for a reform of the Financial Chapter in the Constitution and of the 
Equalisationsystem, to be realised per 1 January 1995. In this reform the inter­
ests of the less prosperous “Laender” - especially the East German ones - had 
to be taken care of, next to the aim of making it attractive for all “Laender” to 
increase their income. Indeed, a Prime Ministers’ meeting of 17 December 1998 
decided to establish a committee between the Federal and the ““Laender”” gov­
ernments to prepare for a reform of the sharing of powers and of government 
revenue between Federation and “Laender”, thereby underlining the connexity 
between powers and income as a basic principle in the German federation.The 
Committee would have to submit its results to a joined committee of both 
houses of the German parliament. The report of the intergovernmental Com­
mittee is still being awaited at this date.
Nimwegen, 1 December 1999
11 dated 30 July 1998
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